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Research report

Structural change in EU labour markets: A generation of employment shifts

Published: 17 September 2025

This report summarises structural developments in EU labour markets from 1995 to 2024. In particular, it describes trends in occupational and sectoral employment at the Member State and aggregate EU levels – mainly the professionalisation and occupational upgrading of employment on the one hand and the shift in employment to services that is occurring across all Member State labour markets on the other. The research demonstrates that since 2011, net employment growth has been increasingly concentrated in well-paid jobs, resulting in employment upgrading. This report tries to reconcile this finding with declining productivity growth in the EU, notably vis-à-vis the United States.

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  • Nearly 30 million more people were in work in 2024 in the EU compared with the turn of the century. This increase is being driven mainly by the higher labour market participation of women and older people, and is despite the technological advances, such as AI and automation, that are transforming the workplace.

  • The rate of structural change in EU labour markets has been trending lower since the global economic crisis, with job reallocation across broad sectors slowing down. Similar trends over longer timeframes have been observed in the United States and United Kingdom labour markets.

  • Occupational upgrading is the strongest vector of structural change across all broad sectors in EU labour markets. The share of professional employment has doubled from 11 % to 22 % between 1995 and 2023, driving faster growth in well-paid jobs than in mid-paid and low-paid ones.

  • Increased qualifications in the EU workforce have not translated into productivity gains. Despite employment upgrading, EU productivity growth has slowed steadily since 1995 – more dramatically than in the US, and in the pre-2004 Member States.

  • Changes in how work is organised and managed can play a key role in addressing the EU’s productivity challenge, which relates to how factors of production are combined. Hence, there is potential for smarter management practices to generate more or better-quality products or services.

This report addresses how the structure of employment in EU labour markets has been changing over the last three decades and assesses its likely direction of travel. It highlights the significant growth in the EU labour market – nearly 30 million net new jobs in less than a generation – and shows how most of this new employment has been created in services sectors, both public and private, and in well-paid professional occupations generally requiring higher qualifications.

As the 2024 report by Mario Draghi, The future of European competitiveness, underlines, however, recent decades have also witnessed the diminishing market share of EU actors in many sectors, including ICT and telecommunications. The report also points to weakness in emerging technologies that are likely sources of future growth, such as artificial intelligence and cloud computing. Addressing and overcoming these shortcomings is a precondition for increasing European prosperity for the coming generation.

The European Union is confronted with major social, geopolitical and economic challenges, including declining productivity growth and emerging competitive threats to important industries. The European Commission’s recent Competitiveness Compass highlights that Europe’s industrial structure is itself a drag on growth, dominated as it is by traditional sectors with relatively low levels of research and development investment and limited prospects of fast growth.

One of the conclusions of this report is that the EU has failed to translate a generation of occupational upgrading into improved productivity performance. The forthcoming union of skills initiative will focus on adult and lifelong learning, future-proofing skills creation and skills portability across borders, as well as attracting and recruiting qualified workers from abroad. This could contribute to harnessing the EU’s abundance of talent to increase mobility, foster innovation and steer sustainable growth.

  • Structural change in the labour markets of modern, advanced economies has manifested itself in similar ways, albeit with varying intensity, across all EU Member States from 1995 to 2024. In all 27 Member States, the share of employment in services has increased and that of employment in manufacturing, agriculture and extractive industries has declined.

  • Construction is the only broad sector where the employment share trend has varied in sign across Member States over the most recent two decades. In most Member States, its share has declined. There were nearly two million fewer construction workers in the EU in 2024 than before the global economic crisis (pre-2007).

  • The rate of structural change in EU labour markets – as measured by the rate of job reallocation across broad sectors – has been trending lower since the global economic crisis. Similar trends over longer time frames have been observed in the United States and United Kingdom labour markets.

  • The strongest vector of change in EU labour markets has been occupational upgrading. This has occurred across all broad sectors. The share of professional employment doubled in the EU in 1995–2023, from 11 % to 22 % across the 12 Member States for which data are available.

  • There are many drivers of structural change in the labour markets of advanced economies. Technological change, notably computerisation and digitalisation, is the most cited demand-side driver, but trade and labour market institutions and supply-side factors, including migration and increased female labour market participation, all count. The mix of these drivers varies across Member States, leading to a variety of employment shift patterns at the national level.

  • More than two thirds of net new employment in the EU created over the last three decades has been taken up by women, contributing to a narrowing of the gender employment gap.

  • Employment growth has strengthened in well-paid jobs and weakened in low-paid jobs. At the aggregate EU level, employment shifts have changed from being asymmetrically polarising in 1995–2008 to increasingly upgrading over the period after the global economic crisis (2011–2024).

  • Jobs in the top quintile by pay have accounted for all net employment growth in the EU during 2019–2024.

  • Occupational upgrading – one consequence of increasing levels of education and growing shares of workers educated to tertiary level – has not been accompanied by a boost in productivity growth in the EU. Productivity growth has decelerated steadily since 1995.

  • Significant differences in productivity growth exist within the EU. Unlike the Member States that acceded to the EU before 2004, in which productivity growth has stalled in recent decades, the Member States that acceded after 2004 are witnessing productivity increases driven by an ongoing shift towards services industries, alongside continued strength in manufacturing. In the post-2004 Member States, structural change – the movement of workers between sectors – is contributing positively to productivity growth, suggesting a reallocation of labour to more productive sectors.

  • Growing divergences in productivity performance between the United States and the EU derive mainly from faster output growth within private services sectors in the former. This is due to greater investment and more efficient leveraging of ICT in sectors such as retail, financial services, information and communication services, and professional, scientific and technical services in the United States.

  • The adoption of new technologies in the workplace has coincided with increasing employment rates and the addition of nearly 30 million workers to the EU headcount over the last three decades. The EU has (again) become a high-participation labour market. Policy should therefore be focused less on the spectre of technological unemployment and more on increasing supply, in particular overcoming barriers to labour market participation among currently under-represented groups. Making work attractive by improving job quality – creating jobs that are stable and decent – contributes to this outcome.

  • The EU lacks a sectoral driver of renewed productivity growth. Manufacturing and private services performed this role until 2008 but have contributed little to output growth since 2011. The sectoral focus of the Draghi report and its identification of specialisations with strong growth potential in the EU – for example, clean technologies, high-performance computing and advanced materials production – establish potential drivers.

  • The EU is not gaining the benefits that it should from human capital improvements. Most of the net increase in employment in the EU over the last three decades has been in well-paid and good-quality jobs. But this has not led to improved productivity performance.

  • Much of the decline in EU productivity growth relates to how factors of production are combined to generate more or better-quality products or services (total factor productivity). This suggests that changes in how work is organised and managed could help take advantage of new generations of workers with higher levels of education and training and with access to increasingly sophisticated digital technologies. Member States, in cooperation with social partners, have a significant role in this regard, through reforms in public investment and education, as well as through employment policies prioritising sustainable, innovation-driven growth.

This section provides information on the data contained in this publication.

The report contains the following lists of tables and figures.

List of tables

Table 1: Employment levels and growth rates in the top 12 employing jobs in the EU-27 (2024)

Table A1: Top 12 employing jobs by job–wage quintile assignment, 2018, EU-27

Table A2: Start years by Member State for EU-LFS data with NACE and ISCO included

 List of figures

Figure 1: EU-27 working-age population and employment levels, 2002–2023

Figure 2: Change in composition of employment by broad sector, 2000–2023 (percentage points)

Figure 3: Job reallocation rate by sector over the preceding five years, EU-12 and EU-27, 1995–2023

Figure 4: Employment share by occupation, 1995–2023, EU-12

Figure 5: Compound annual growth rate (CAGR) in professional employment, 1995–2023 (%)

Figure 6: Broad sectoral employment trends for selected Member States, cohort aged 15–64

Figure 7: Employment share of public and private sectors, selected Member States, cohort aged 15–64 (%)

Figure 8: Private tertiary subsector employment in selected Member States, share of working population, cohort aged 15–64 (%)

Figure 9: Occupational trends for selected Member States, share of working population, cohort aged 15–64 (%)

Figure 10: Employment change in CAGR by job–wage quintile, EU-27, 2011–2024 (%)

Figure 11: Employment change by job–wage quintile, EU-12 and EU-27, 1995–2024 (CAGR %)

Figure 12: Employment shifts by job–wage quintile in selected Member States, 1995–2008 (CAGR % per annum)

Figure 13: Employment shifts by job–wage quintile in selected Member States, 2008–2010 (CAGR % per annum)

Figure 14: Employment change by job–wage quintile, 2011–2024 (CAGR % per annum)

Figure 15: EU net employment shifts by broad sector, 1995–2024 (millions)

Figure 16: Trends in labour productivity, total value added per worker, 1995–2020 (in EUR 000s at 2015 prices)

Figure 17: Threefold decomposition of productivity growth for the EU and the United States (percentage points)

Figure 18: The within component of productivity growth by Member State, 1995–2020 (percentage points)

Figure 19: The reallocation component of productivity growth by Member State, 1995–2020 (percentage points)

Figure 20: Value added and employment trajectories of EU and US economies, 1995–2020

Figure 21: Contributions to productivity growth in the EU and the United States by sector and period (%)

Figure A1: Employment shifts by Member State and job–wage quintile, 1993–2008 (CAGR %)

Figure A2: Employment shifts by Member State and job–wage quintile, 2008–2010 (CAGR %)

Figure A3: Employment shifts by Member State and job–wage quintile, 2011–2024 (CAGR %)

Figure A4: Employment shifts by sector and job–wage quintile, EU-12, 1995–2008 (thousands)

Figure A5: Employment shifts by sector and job–wage quintile, EU-27, 2008–2010 (thousands)

Learn more about the authors of this publication.

Eurofound recommends citing this publication in the following way.

Eurofound (2025), Structural change in EU labour markets: A generation of employment shifts, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.

ISBN

978-92-897-2502-6

Number of pages

56

Reference no.

EF25022

ISBN

978-92-897-2502-6

Catalogue number

TJ-01-25-019-EN-N

DOI

10.2806/2582210

Permalink

https://eurofound.link/ef25022

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European Jobs Monitor

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